Abstract-In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss (BBS) proposed proxy re-signatures, in which a semi trusted proxy acts as a translator between Alice and Bob. The proxy resignature schemes can be applied in many applications. However, the existing proxy re-signature schemes were all based on Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this paper, we present a proxy re-signature scheme based on quadratic residues, which is Bidirectional. The scheme is safety under the random oracle model. At the same time, the definition of forward-secure proxy re-signature is given, then a corresponding scheme is presented which can maintain the former signature's safety even if current cycle's Signature key has been leaked.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proxy re-signature schemes, introduced by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [1] , and formalized later by Ateniese and Hohenberger [2] . Digital signature schemes allow a signer to transform any message into a signed message, such that anyone can verify the validity of the signed message using the signer's public key, but only the signer can generate signed messages. In a proxy resignature scheme, a semi-trusted proxy is given some information which allows it to transform Alice's signature on a message m into Bob's signature on m , but the proxy cannot, on its own, generate signatures for either Alice or Bob. A proxy re-signature scheme has eight desirable properties [2] as follows, though none of existing schemes satisfies all properties at the same time, see Table 1. 1. Unidirectional: In a unidirectional scheme, a resignature key allows the proxy to transform A's signature to B's but not vice versa. In a bidirectional scheme, on the other hand, the re-signature key allows the proxy to transform A's signature to B's as well as B's signature to A's.
2. Multi-use: A transformed signature can be retransformed again by the proxy.
3. Private Proxy: The re-signature key can be kept secret by the proxy. 4 . Transparent: A signature on the same message signed by the delegator is computationally indistinguishable from a signature transformed by a proxy.
5. Key-Optimal: In a key-optimal scheme, a user is required to protect and store only a small constant amount of secrets no matter how many signature delegations the user gives or accepts.
6. Non-interactive: The delegatee is not required to participate in a delegation process.
7. Non-transitive: A re-signing right cannot be redelegated by the proxy alone.
8. Temporary: A re-signing right is temporary. The proxy re-signature schemes can be applied in many applications, for instance, we can use proxy resignature schemes to simplify key management [1] , provide proofs for a path that has been taken, manage group signatures, simplify certificate management [2] , construct a Digital Rights Management (DRM) interoperable system [3] .
Up to now, the security proven of existing proxy resignature schemes is under Diffie-Hellman assumption [1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9] . In this paper, we first propose a proxy resignature scheme based on quadratic residues, it satisfies bidirectional, multi-use, private proxy, transparent properties. We prove that it can resist adaptive chosen message attack. Exposure of secret keys can be a devastating attack on a digital signature scheme since such an attack typically implies that all security guarantees are lost. The notion of forward security was recently proposed by Anderson [4] and later formalized by Bellare and Miner [5] . Based on the framework of the first scheme, we propose a forward secure proxy re-signature scheme, which can be considered as a forward secure extension of the first scheme.
II. BACKGROUND

A. quadratic residue
In number theory, an integer q is called a quadratic residue modulo n if it is congruent to a perfect square (mod n); i.e., if there exists an integer x such that:
Otherwise, q is called a quadratic nonresidue (mod n). Originally an abstract mathematical concept from the branch of number theory known as modular arithmetic, quadratic residues are now used in applications ranging from acoustical engineering to cryptography and the factoring of large numbers.
B. Remarks on the BBS Scheme
The authors of the BBS paper proposed some potential applications of proxy re-signatures. By taking a careful look at how one can use these proxy re-signatures in practice, we can see no that the BBS construction has its own limitations. In brief, their scheme is actually "proxyless" since it is possible to recover the information that would be stored at the proxy by looking at the original signature and its transformation. This precludes the possibility of having a proxy in the first place since anyone would be able to impersonate the proxy itself once a single re-signature is released.
C. Forward secure signatures
The goal of forward security is to protect the risk of key exposure, but in a simple way, in particular without requiring distribution or protected storage devices, and without increasing key management costs.
A user begins, as usual, by registering a public key pk and keeping private the corresponding secret key, which we denote 0 sk . The time during which the public key pk is desired to be valid is divided into periods, say T of them.
While the public key stays fixed, the user "evolves" the secret key with time. Thus in each period, the user produces signatures using a different signing key: 1 sk in period 1, 2 sk in period 2, and so on. The secret key in period i is derived as a function of the one in the previous period. The key evolution paradigm is illustrated in Figure 1 .
III. DEFINITIONS
A. Bidirectional Proxy Re-Signature
Definition 1: A proxy re-signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms (KeyGen, ReKey, Sign, ReSign, Verify), where:
(KeyGen, Sign, Verify) form the standard key generation, signing, and verification algorithms.
On input ( , )
A B sk sk , the re-signature key generation algorithm, ReKey, outputs a key We define security for bidirectional proxy re-signature schemes by the following game between a challenger and an adversary: (Note that we adopt the method in [6] to define the security notion of bidirectional proxy reencryption schemes: static corruption, i.e., in this security notion, the adversary has to determine the corrupted parties before the computation starts, and it does not allow adaptive corruption of proxies between corrupted and uncorrupted parties.)
Queries. 
A succeeds =
Where the probability is taken over all coin tosses made by the challenger and the adversary.
B. Bidirectional forward-secure Proxy Re-Signature
Definition 2: A forward-secure proxy re-signature scheme is a tuple of polynomial time algorithms (KeyGen, ReKey, Update, Sign, ReSign, Verify), where:
The key generation algorithm, KeyGen, takes as input a security parameter1 k and the total number of time periods N . It returns a public key pk and an initial secret key 0 sk . Sign rk pk pk m σ =
We also define the security notion of bidirectional forward-secure proxy re-signature with static corruption by a game between a challenger and an adversary.
Queries , where the probability is taken over all coin tosses made by the challenger and the adversary.
IV. BIDIRECTIONAL PROXY RE-SIGNATURE SCHEMES
A. Bidirectional Proxy Re-signature Schemes Based on quadratic residues
KeyGen: On input the security parameter k , it chooses two security prime numbers Theorem 1 (Security) In the random oracle model, the bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme we presented is correct and existentially unforgeable under the lemma 1.
Proof. The correctness property is easily observable. We show security using forking lemma [11] .
If there exists an adversary A that can break the above proxy re-signature scheme with non-negligible probability ε after making at most S q sign queries, R q resign queries, K q (un)corrupted key queries and H q hash queries, then there also exists an adversary B that can solve the quadratic residues problem in G with probability 1
, it is difficult to calculate the quadratic residues of y , that is, x . Quadratic residues adversary B simulates a bidirectional proxy re-signature security game for A as follows:
Queries: B builds the following oracles: Ⅳ. A FORWARD SECURE PROXY RE-SIGNATURE SCHEME Based on the above proxy re-signature scheme, we present a forward secure proxy re-signature scheme as follows. The scheme's security is base on the Strong RSA Assumption [9] . he can solve the Strong RSA Assumption. Thus, the scheme is forward secure. The scheme is also existentially unforgivable.
B. Security Analysis
Theorem 2 (Security) In the random oracle model, the forward secure proxy re-signature scheme we presented is correct and existentially unforgivable under the lemma 1.
If there exists an adversary A that can break the above proxy re-signature scheme with non-negligible probability ε after making at most S q sign queries, R q resign queries, K q (un)corrupted key queries and H q hash queries, then there also exists an adversary B that can solve the quadratic residues problem in G with probability 1 ' 
